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RECENT CASES

Constitutional Law-EQUAL
Child v. Evans, Minn. -,

PROTECTION AND ILLEGITIMACY-

Unborn

245 N.W.2d 600 (1976).

In the recent case of Unborn Child v. Evans,I the Minnesota Supreme
Court considered the question of whether denial to a child of life insurance proceeds solely on the basis of the child's illegitimacy violates the
equal protection clause.' The plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant
of summary judgment and dismissal of the complaint. Finding that
factual disputes existed, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the
trial court and remanded the case. The supreme court stated that denial
of life insurance proceeds solely on the basis of a beneficiary's illegitimacy violates the equal protection clause.
The insured and plaintiff's mother were married in July 1970 and
divorced in February 1972. In March of 1972 plaintiff's mother conceived plaintiff. The insured admitted paternity and the couple planned
to remarry. Before they could remarry, the insured was killed in an
automobile accident.
The insured had been employed by the state of Minnesota. A group
life insurance policy had been negotiated on his behalf by the State
Employees Insurance Benefit Board (S.E.I.B.B.) with two private insurance companies. 3 The policy provided for $50,000 double indemnity in
case of accidental death. The policy's substitute beneficiary clause provided that if no beneficiary was named the benefits would be paid according to the following priority: "1. Your surviving lawful wife or husband; 2. Your surviving children in equal shares; 3. Your surviving
parents in equal shares; 4. The duly appointed legal representative of
your estate."4 The policy defined "children" as "only first generation
lawful bodily issue and legally adopted persons." 5
The insured died in June 1972 without naming a beneficiary. After his
death, according to the priority established in the substitute beneficiary
clause, his parents received the insurance policy proceeds. Plaintiff, the
insured's posthumous illegitimate child,' was born in December 1972.
Plaintiff's mother, and natural guardian, claimed the life insurance pro1. __
Minn. __,
245 N.W.2d 600 (1976).
2. The fourteenth amendment provides in part: "No State shall ..
deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. The Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company and the Northwestern National Life
Insurance Company issued the insured's group life insurance policy based on a contract
with the state. Minn. at __,
245 N.W.2d at 602.
4. Id.

5. Id.
6. The court concluded the fact that the child was posthumous was not important since
it should be treated as if it had been living at the time of the insured's death. See id. at
__.,
245 N.W.2d at 603. By analogy, the court relied on MINN. STAT. § 525.171 (1976)
which, relating to intestate succession, provides: "A posthumous child shall be considered
as living at the death of its parent."
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ceeds on behalf of plaintiff. Plaintiffs mother alleged that the exclusion
of illegitimate children from the substitute beneficiary clause definition
of children was a denial of equal protection.
The equal protection clause provides in part that no person shall be
denied equal protection of the laws.7 The clause is directed to the states
so that no state may arbitrarily discriminate through legislation or
otherwise.' However, it is well-recognized that a state may legislatively
classify persons without violating the equal protection clause.' Such a
classification must, however, be based on a material difference between
the classes" or a legitimate state interest" to be valid.
The Minnesota Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff must prove
three things to establish a violation of the equal protection clause:' first,
the denial of proceeds was the result of state action; 3 second, the denial
of proceeds was based solely on the child's illegitimacy; 4 third, there
was no legitimate state interest justifying the classification. 5
The supreme court held that the S.E.I.B.B.'s authorization and execution of the contract on behalf of state employees constituted state
action for the purpose of the fourteenth amendment. It noted that state
action is not limited to legislative, executive, or judicial action but
includes "all the instrumentalities by which the State acts." Thus, the
fact that the insurance policies were issued by private insurance companies did not preclude the existence of state action. For the purpose of
the appeal, the court assumed that the insured did not have an adequate
opportunity to designate a beneficiary. If the insured had a chance to
designate a beneficiary, but decided to adopt the substitute beneficiary
clause, the denial of participation in the insurance proceeds would have
been the result of private action and not state action.
Next the court concluded the denial of proceeds was based solely upon
7. See note 2 supra.

8. See, e.g., Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 565 (1974); Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
9. See, e.g., Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-28 (1959); Borden's Farm
Prods. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 209-10 (1934).
10. E.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 583 (1935).
11. To be valid, a classification must be reasonably related to obtaining a legitimate
state interest, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972); White v.
Fleming, 522 F.2d 730, 734 (7th Cir. 1975), that is, it must not be arbitrary or without a
rational basis. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
12.

-

Minn. at

__,

245 N.W.2d at 603-07.

13. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
14. If the denial of proceeds was based on some other reason not objectionable under
Minn.
the equal protection clause there would not be a denial of equal protection. at

__,

245 N.W.2d at 604.

15. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
, 245 N.W.2d at 604 (quoting Raymond v. Chicago Union Trac16. -. Minn. at tion Co., 207 U.S. 20, 35 (1907)).
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the child's illegitimacy. This conclusion was based on the fact that
insurance proceeds would not have been denied to a surviving posthumous legitimate child. 7
Finally, the court noted that legitimate state interests may exist for
having a classification based on a child's illegitimacy when the state
furnishes life insurance to its employees. Specifically, the state has an
interest in avoiding fraudulent claims" and in seeing that insurance
proceeds are promptly paid to those entitled to them. However, the
court reasoned, these interests are not sufficient to prevent illegitimate
children who are clearly children of the insured from participating in life
insurance proceeds."
In support of its decision, the court noted a trend of judicial holdings
finding that classification based on illegitimacy violates the equal protection clause. 3 Although the United States Supreme Court has stated
that illegitimacy is not a suspect classification," in only two 22 of the

twelve casesl on the issue since 1968 has the Court upheld the constitu17. The court reasoned that in a rare case a married couple could conceive a child and
then be divorced. If the father died before the birth of the child but after the divorce, there
would not be a surviving spouse, but with the birth of the child there would be a surviving
legitimate child. The surviving posthumous legitimate child would be entitled to the
insurance proceeds according to the priority stated in the substitute beneficiary clause
while a surviving posthumous illegitimate child would not. Minn. at , 245
N.W.2d at 603.
18. Id. at -,
245 N.W.2d at 607. However, "[ilt does not [necessarily] follow . . .
that the blanket and conclusive exclusion . . . of illegitimates is reasonably related to the
presentation of spurious claims." Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 636 (1974).
19. See Minn. at -,
245 N.W.2d at 607. In addition, the court indicated the
fact that more time may be required to locate and verify the identity of illegitimates was
not a sufficient reason to completely bar them from receiving insurance proceeds. Id. at
__
245 N.W.2d at 607-08.
20. For a general discussion of this judicial trend, see Krause, Equal Protectionfor the
Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REv. 477 (1967).
21. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506
(1976). Although the Supreme Court refused to hold that illegitimacy was a suspect
classification, the Court noted that illegitimacy was similiar to other personal characteristics which have been held to be suspect, id. at 505, and that its scrutiny of illegitimacy
"is not a toothless one." Id. at 510.
22. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
23. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (portion of Illinois probate code denying
illegitimate children the right to inherit from their father by intestate succession held
unconstitutional); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (portion of Social Security Act
requiring proof of dependency in cases involving illegitimates, while dependency is assumed in cases involving legitimate children, held constitutional); Jimenez v. Weinberger,
417 U.S. 628 (1974) (portion of Social Security Act excluding post-disability illegitimate
children from disability insurance benefits, while post-disability legitimate children
would almost automaticially qualify, held unconstitutional); New Jersey Welfare Rights
Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (portion of state statute providing financial
assistance to poor families with legitimate children, but not those families with illegitimate children, held unconstitutional); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972) (state law
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tionality of such classifications. And one of the two cases which upheld
a state intestate succession statute appears to have been overruled by a
recent Court decision involving a similiar statute.24
The Minnesota Supreme Court's implicit decision to consider classifications based on illegitimacy on a case-by-case basis = is in accord with
the United States Supreme Court's decisions holding that classifications
based on illegitimacy are not illegal per se or even suspect classifications."5 The Minnesota court's decision in Unborn Child would have
been more helpful, however, if it had indicated what type of state inter27
ests might justify such a classification.
granting legitimate children judicially enforceable right to support from natural father,
but not to illegitimate children, held unconstitutional); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164 (1972) (portion of state workers' compensation statute which prevented
illegitimate children from sharing equally with legitimate children in death benefits held
unconstitutional); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (portion of Louisiana intestate
succession statute which barred illegitimate children from sharing equally with legitimate
children in their father's estate held constitutional); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins.
Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (portion of state wrongful death statute which barred recovery by
parent for death of illegitimate child, while parent of legitimate child could recover, held
unconstitutional); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (portion of state statute creating
a wrongful death action in favor of legitimate children, but not illegitimate children, held
unconstitutional); Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S.
901 (1974) (portion of Social Security Act excluding post-disability illegitimate children
from disability insurance benefits, while post-disability legitimate children would almost
automatically qualify, held unconstitutional); Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226
(D. Md.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 1069 (1972) (portion of Social Security Act applying
reduction of insurance benefits first to those payable to certain illegitimate children held
unconstitutional); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588 (D. Conn.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S.
1069 (1972) (portion of Social Security Act reducing benefits payable to illegitimate children if family award not sufficient to pay spouse and legitimate children held unconstitutional).
24. In 1971 the Supreme Court in Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), upheld the
constitutionality of Louisiana's intestate succession statute which barred illegitimate children from inheriting equally with legitimate children from their father's estate. Illegitimate children could inherit only if they had been acknowledged by their father and only
if he left no other relatives; in other words they could inherit only to the exclusion of the
state. In the 1977 case of Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional, as a denial of equal protection, the Illinois' intestate succession statute
which barred illegitimate children from inheriting from their father's estate. While the
Court in Trimble attempted to distinguish the Illinois statute from the Louisiana statute,
it was forced to state that "[diespite these differences, it is apparent that we have
examined the Illinois statute more critically than the Court examined the Louisiana
statute in Labine. To the extent that our analysis in this case differs from that in Labine
the more recent analysis controls." Id. at 776 n.17.
25. The Minnesota Supreme Court did not indicate whether legitimate and illegitimate
children should receive equal treatment with respect to all rights. By remaining silent on
the question, the court implicitly decided to treat classifications based on illegitimacy on
a case-by-case basis, as the United States Supreme Court has done. See note 23 supra.
26. See note 21 supra.
27. The two most recent United States Supreme Court cases upholding the constitutionality of classifications based on illegitimacy, see note 22 supra and accompanying text,
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Finally, it should be noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court faced
the equal protection issue squarely instead of attempting to rewrite the
insurance contract to change its definition of children. Although the
plaintiff did not argue that the contract should be reformed, other courts
have used this approach in similar fact situations, and have thus
avoided the equal protection issue." In Unborn Child, it would have
been difficult, however, to avoid the equal protection question because
the definition of children in the insurance policy specifically included
only "first generation lawful bodily issue and legally adopted persons."'
As a result of Unborn Child, the rights of illegitimates in one area of
the law are more certain. In the future, the Minnesota Supreme Court
will undoubtedly hold that discrimination in the distribution of life
insurance proceeds solely on the basis of illegitimacy violates the equal
protection clause. It is also likely that the court will hold other classifications based solely on illegitimacy to be unconstitutional as a violation
of equal protection, absent a strong state interest.
do provide some guidelines. In Labine the Court upheld the constitutionality of Louisiana's intestate succession statute which barred illegitimate children from sharing equally
with legitimate children in their father's estate based on Louisiana's interest in strengthening and preserving family ties. 401 U.S. at 536-38. However, as the Court noted, the
statute did not bar an illegitimate child from inheriting from his father since the father
could have executed a will devising a portion of his estate to his illegitimate child. Id. at
539. The usefulness of Labine for defining what interests may be sufficient for upholding
a statutory classification based on illegitimacy has, however, been severely limited by
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
In Mathews the Court upheld the portion of the Social Security Act which created a
presumption of dependency in favor of legitimates but not in favor of illegitimates on the
basis that the statutory classification was justified as part of a statutory design "to qualify
entitlement to benefits upon a child's dependency at the time of the parent's death." 427
U.S. at 510. The Court further noted that an illegitimate was not denied benefits "solely
and finally on the basis of illegitimacy" since an illegitimate could receive benefits by
proving dependency. Id. at 511-13. Thus, Mathews suggests that a classification based on
illegitimacy may be constitutional if it does not completely bar illegitimates but only
creates a presumption in favor of legitimates, assuming, of course, that the classification
is reasonably related to the objectives of the statute. See note 11 supra and accompanying
text.
28. See, e.g., Turner v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 56 Cal. App. 2d 862, 133 P.2d 859
(1943). In Turner the California Court of Appeals reasoned that insurance contracts are
governed by contract law and not the common law of intestate succession which, in 1943,
generally discriminated.against illegitimates. In contract law, words are interpreted in
their ordinary sense, unless they have a technical meaning, and the dictionary definition
of "children" does not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children. Thus, the
court interpreted "children" to include all children regardless of legitimacy. Id. at 86566, 133 P.2d at 860-61 (1943); accord, Samuels v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 48 Mich. App. 761,
211 N.W.2d 104 (1973); Butcher v. Pollard, 32 Ohio App. 2d 1, 288 N.E. 2d 204 (1972).
See generally Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 1329 (1975).
29. Minn. at __ , 245 N.W.2d at 602.
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